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Unicorns are companies with a high level technology where their market value is more 
than 1 billion dollars and are not listed on the Stock Exchange. The study aims to measure 
the changes in market values of unicorns and identify which variables influence their 
market values in different moments of time. By comparing the market values, it was 
verified that unicorns before IPO are undervalued in relation to the subsequent periods. 
Furthermore, the linear regressions show that the level of undervaluation and sales 
volume appear to influence positively the unicorns market value, while the level of 
financial leverage seems to have a negative influence. The capital retention after IPO does 
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The term "unicorn" came about in 2013 when Lee (2013) used the mythological 
animal's name to characterize technological start-ups worth more than $ 1 billion and are 
not quoted on the stock exchange. More specifically, Aileen Lee chose the term unicorn 
to define the statistical rarity of companies by 2013 to reach the value of 1 billion dollars 
(in Anglo-Saxon terminology, 1 billion dollars). Unicorns exist globally, notably in 
markets such as Europe, China, India and the United States of America, among others 
(Grillo, 2016). The digital revolution has reached a scale never before seen and a level of 
impact that no business, government or industry can ignore. The rapid development and 
adoption of information technologies are creating new and innovative business 
opportunities (Lubián & Esteves, 2017). In the corporate ecosystem, coupled with the 
increase in information and communication technology, there is a growing increase in 
startup creation. According to Kerai (2017), technological start-ups are often considered 
to be drivers of value creation, economic growth, and job creation. Taking advantage of 
this condition, start-ups seek to function as disruptive innovations to match unmet needs 
in other sectors (Roy, 2018). Many start-up’s, being in an initial phase and of great 
investments, present negative results. In the growth phase, investors are increasingly 
comfortable absorbing these losses through capital-funded capital increases, creating a 
dynamic that favours increased valuations (Kenney & Zysman, 2018).  
Unicorns are effectively start-ups and, due to business uncertainty, their assessments 
are often based on their growth prospects (Göbel, 2016). The high levels of technology 
they present, coupled with the high coverage provided by the media, reduce the 
asymmetry of information, positively influencing the level of their evaluations 
(Zörgiebel, 2016). Although evaluations are high, the economic-financial indicators do 
not translate this evidence, and there are often negative net results. With the use of the 
term "unicorn", the interest and the curiosity of the investors by the subject grew in a 
notorious way and at the global level. In the financial markets, enormous scepticism and 
distrust were generated in the face of these assessments. Lack of transparency and 
financial information makes it difficult to properly evaluate a company (Kerai, 2017). 
Some researchers suggest that high scores, compared to the dot.com period, are more 
reasonable and rational, although some analysts suggest that these levels approach 




2. Literature Review 
 
2.1. The Unicorns and their evaluation 
 
A startup can be defined as a company created to develop an innovative product or service 
under conditions of uncertainty (Ries, 2011). Of these companies only a minimal 
percentage, can get the unicorn label (Mihaela, 2017). Unicorns are start-ups, which have 
a market value of over $ 1 billion and are not public quoted (Brown & Wiles, 2015). 
According to Ochoa, Salas and Núñes (2016) unicorns are companies where their market 
value is over one billion dollars and whose valuation is calculated using different rounds 
of financing. Gornall and Strebulaev (2015) define unicorn as a venture that, through the 
raising of venture capital, achieves an evaluation of more than one billion dollars in at 
least one of the funding rounds. Unicorns have high levels of information technology, 
particularly at the software and hardware level (Grillo, 2016). Operating in more than one 
region, its innovative services seek to satisfy the needs not met by the current market 
players. For Fan (2016) unicorns are considered disruptive innovations, presenting 
potential to change the way we use services on a day to day basis. The behaviour and 
strategic thinking that they exhibit in the markets completely break the existing standards. 
Similarly, Grillo (2016) pointed to disruptive innovations and the way people do things 
as a form of value creation by unicorns. These companies seek to meet their needs more 
efficiently. Unicorns can stimulate the economic development of a region, according to 
Fan (2016). The size and demand for the services they provide generate a need to build 
infrastructures and services that help them, thus influencing the growth of other 
industries.  
For De Massis, Frattini and Quillico (2016) the unicorns present three common 
characteristics: they are small companies; led by experienced entrepreneurs; and financed 
by venture capital. On the other hand, Grillo (2016) stated that these companies have the 
following characteristics: experienced and entrepreneurial leaders; an organic growth, 
focusing on increasing production and sales; financing through risk capital; and high 
levels of research and development. According to Grillo (2016) unicorns are venture 
capital companies, which is the most widely used source of funding. It is through venture 
capital that a startup manages to cover its operating expenses, make its investments and 
continue to grow. According to Gornall and Strebulaev (2015) venture capital is a widely 
used and highly speculative form of financing. It is used by innovative startups that show 
a high risk, like unicorns. Underlying this type of financing is the support provided by 
venture capital investors in terms of strategic orientation. This type of financing helps 
companies that are not listed, growing and thriving (Grillo, 2016). While the path to 
sustainable growth is related to the injection of risk capital into startups, they can also 
grow through strategic decisions such as acquiring other businesses or holding stake in 
others. The acquisition of WhatsApp by Facebook for $ 22 billion exemplifies one of 
these operations (Frier, 2014). 
Vital (2013) presented a process of financing through venture capital to which these 
companies are subject. 
1. The first investments are financed by friends and family of the creators of the idea, 
holding these 100% of the company; 
2. In the next phase, carried out by Business Angels, the so-called "Seed Investments" 
serve to consolidate and flow the business idea. After this phase, the company goes 
through a process of market appreciation, which will allow investors to assess whether 
the business idea is sustainable, innovative and presents potential for growth. If the 





3. The first round is for Series A, serving to optimize business, product and access to vital 
markets; 
4. In the second round, with Series B, the purpose is to raise capital in order to develop 
the company, expand market horizons and build a solid business model; 
5. In a third round, where bank investors and large investment firms already participate, 
the C Series serve to perfect every aspect of the business and essentially prepare the 
company for the IPO process if appropriate. 
The possibility of obtaining venture capital without the obligation to disclose private 
information encourages companies to remain private (Kerai, 2017), and is far from public 
scrutiny. This data translates into more funding rounds than the usual ones. 
 
For Göbel (2016), evaluating a startup appears to be a difficult task because of its short 
financial track record and uncertainty about its growth potential. Typically, these 
companies face high levels of volatility. The fact that their market values are too high 
may be related to aspects such as the level of notoriety, media coverage or the type of 
capital that is used to develop the business. The valuation of these companies is based on 
a high level of speculation associated with the expectations of future growth and 
profitability of their business models. As they are companies that do not operate in the 
regulated market, there are often asymmetries of information. Previous studies have 
shown that the high level of media coverage makes leverage evaluations. Zörgiebel 
(2016) stated that high levels of media coverage can reduce the gap in information 
between investors and founders. Consequently, the levels of information asymmetry 
become relatively low, triggering the assessments. This process leads to a gain in 
legitimacy and credibility. For Rindova, Petkova and Gupta (2013) the value of the 
evaluation of these companies is affected by media coverage in two different ways. First, 
media coverage serves the public interest, which can positively influence stakeholders 
such as customers and employees. Secondly, new information becomes widely available, 
lowering the costs of obtaining information, with a gain in the legitimacy and credibility 
of the company. On the other hand, Zörgiebel (2016) noted that risk capital inflows 
increase valuation levels. Likewise, the entry of an investor in the first phase will allow 
the entry of more risk capital, which increases the company's valuation (Bartlett, 2015). 
 
Gompers and Lerner (2001) have argued that venture capital has developed as an 
important factor in financial markets, providing capital for companies that might 
otherwise have difficulty capturing. Therefore, for Grillo (2016) the value of the company 
is linked to the amount of capital invested, and its value will be higher or lower depending 
on the financing rounds to which the company is subject. Currently the most valuable 
unicorns are Ant Financial worth $ 150 billion, Toutiao (Bytedance) about $ 75 billion, 
and Didi Chuxing $ 46 billion (December 2019). These companies are credited with the 
design of "Decacorns", companies with a market value of more than 10 billion dollars 
(Grillo, 2016). The sectors of activity that incorporate the most valuable unicorns are the 
E-Commerce / Marketplace, Internet Software & Services, FinTech and more than half 
(54%) of unicorns are based in the United States of America and about 24% Chinese 
(Friedman, 2017). 
 
2.2. IPO and the critical factors 
 
According to Ritter J. (1998) an IPO is the sell of shares of a company to the public in a 




look to IPO as a way of expanding and diversifying their operations or developing new 
technologies and products. Ritter and Welch (2002) point to market conditions as the 
most important factor in the capital dispersion decision. The life cycle of the company is 
also considered as an important factor in this type of decision. From the perspective of 
the investor, IPO in companies with a high growth potential is seen as an investment 
opportunity. The issuing companies to make the decision whether or not to carry out the 
IPO, have several assumptions under consideration. According to Miguel Sousa quoted 
by Neto (2015, p.3), companies carry out an IPO for the following reasons: - Fund raising 
in the capital market at a lower cost; - broaden and diversify the portfolio of investments; 
- raise its image before all Stakeholders; - appreciation by the market of the real value of 
the company. Through their studies, DeAngelo, Linda and Stulz (2010) analyzed the best 
phase of the companies for the dispersion of their social capital. The authors point out 
that the best moment is related to the life cycle of the company and the costs associated 
with entering the regulated market. In turn, Lowry, Michaely and Volkova (2017) 
indicated that companies choose to spread their capital to raise the capital needed for their 
investments. 
Ritter J. (1991) argued that the issuer's decision to divest the capital is related to investors' 
high expectations of their future and potential for growth. Brau, Ryan, and DeGraw 
(2006) listed a number of reasons that may lead companies to disperse their social capital. 
One of the reasons is related to the funds needed for the company's growth, both 
immediate and long term. Another reason is the retention and maintenance of company 
control. Liquidity, according to them, is also a factor to be taken into account for a 
company that intends to carry out the IPO. According to Peristiani and Hong (2004), 
companies that aim to disperse their capital, poor financial performance can be revealing 
for the future of them. The authors also listed the macroeconomic conditions as an 
economic slowdown and specific industry facts, such as increased competitiveness, 
possible causes for the failure of an IPO. 
The performance after the issuance of IPO refers to the behaviour of stock prices of the 
issuing company after the first day of capital dispersion (Sahoo & Rajib, 2010). 
According to Wong and Sue (2017) short-term and long-term performance are two 
anomalies present in IPOs. Through their study, Bhabra and Pettway (2003) verified that 
factors such as the subscriber's reputation, cash flow, research and development expenses, 
the size of the company, the relative size of the offer and the intrinsic risk factors at the 
time of offer help to predict performance after the issuance of IPO. Hensler, Rutherford 
and Springer (1997) studied the effects of certain characteristics on the performance of 
the companies that performed an IPO. They concluded that the size of the offer, the level 
of undervaluation, the percentage of capital retention and the period of activity of the IPO 
are statistically significant and positive in explaining the positive performance after the 
IPO. According to Hoechle and Schmid (2007) the poor performance of IPO is more 
pronounced during the first year after the dispersion of capital. This poor performance 
was explained by the characteristics of the company, such as the Market-to-Book Ratio 
and the costs of research and development. 
Through the study of the performance of IPOs in the Chinese markets, Jing, Liao and 
Qian (2015) have shown that high initial returns, a high level of financial leverage and a 
high Price to Earnings Ratio lead to poor performance after IPO. 
Opportunities for growth are a critical factor in the evaluation of IPOs. (Myers, 1977) 
showed through his studies that the market value of the company is positively related to 
the growth opportunities of the company. The studies by Peristiani and Hong (2004) have 
shown that firms that maintain high capital retention rates increase the market survival 




value of the company is positively related to the percentage of capital retained by the 
entrepreneur. On the other hand, Thomsonkis, Nounis and Gounopoulos (2012), through 
the study that analyzed the long-term performance of 254 Greek IPO’s, indicated that the 
subscriber's reputation does not seem to influence performance after IPO's issuance. 
According to Börner and Pezus (2015) the understatement occurs when the offer price is 
less than the closing price. As a consequence, investors who buy shares at the offer price 
are earning initial returns. This phenomenon is often observable in emerging markets. 
The study developed by Zarafat and Vejzagic (2014), which analyzed the profitability of 
the companies that carried out IPO belonging to Bursa Malaysia (BM), allowed us to 
conclude that initial returns and company size are determining variables, helping to 
explain returns a year later to IPO. The same study pointed to the company's gross 
revenues as a determinant and explanatory variable of the yields two years after the issue. 
Gounopoulos, Nounis and Stylianides (2007) stated that the size of the company 
influences long-term performance in the CYVI performance of the Cyprus Stock 
Exchange (CYE) during the period 1992-2002. The percentage of capital retained as an 
important variable up to one year after IPO was also indicated. Through their study, 
Goergen, Khurshed and Mudambi (2007) concluded that the size of the company is 
positively related to long-term performance. Subscriber reputation, company operating 
history, and company age do not account for long-term returns. On the other hand, the 
undervaluation explains the poor performance in the long run.  
The study by Peristiani and Hong (2004) revealed that the company's operating history is 
a good predictor for post-issuance market survival. During the period between 1999 and 
2000, the companies that carried out the IPO presented significantly different 
characteristics, namely the capital structure and the level of sales and net results, 
compared to the usual companies that are candidates for IPO (Ljungqvist & William, 
2003). The study by Derrien (2005), which analysed the impact of the investor sentiment 
in the definition of the IPO price in the French stock market during the period of 1999 
and 2001 showed that the more favourable the investor sentiment at the time of the offer 
the higher the price of the shares. The same study showed that investor sentiment may 
have a significant impact on IPO 's stock prices and their behaviour after IPO. According 
to Derrien (2005), many of the 803 IPO’s conducted in the United States during the period 
of Dot.com (1999 and 2000) were overvalued so that either the business was either bought 
at a low price or eventually out of the market . This argument is supported by 
Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004), who indicated that the majority of overvalued 







3. Data and methodology 
 
3.1. Data  
 
To define the companies that constituted the study, we used the unicorn tracker of 
CBInsights and the website of the NASDAQ market index. The tracker, a list of 
companies belonging to the unicorns group, has, together with the NASDAQ website 
selected the companies to include. Through the aforementioned sources, all the 
companies that stopped being part of the unicorns club were selected after their IPO. The 
website of the NASDAQ index, aided in the clearance of these companies. It was also 
necessary to collect the financial data of the companies. Financial data and prospects for 
unicorn IPO’s were collected through online databases such as Datastream, Yahoo 
Finance, IPO Database, Seeking Alpha and Macrotrends. Prospects of IPOs, accessed 
through the IPO Database, allowed access to the financial statements of unicorns. 
Datastream, Yahoo Finance, Seeking Alpha and Macrotrends enabled the collection of 
market prices and values of unicorns and respective markets, as well as information 
related to financial ratios and share capital allocation. Financial information was also 
collected from unicorn websites. Initially the sample counted 309 companies. 
Subsequently a selection of companies to be considered for the study was carried out. 
This procedure obeyed four criteria: 1. Only all companies that performed an IPO, have 
been considered since the CBInsights tracker takes into account all unicorns, including 
those that were acquired instead of IPO; 2. Only companies that performed IPO in the 
United States of America market indices, namely, NASDAQ and NYSE, were taken into 
account; 3. The companies' IPO would have had to be made on a date after the year 2013, 
inclusive; 4. Finally, given the criteria applied above, the companies that were considered 




3.2. Data analysis  
3.2.1. Sample  
The sample consists of 44 unicorns. Table 1 shows the number of IPO’s per year in 
both market indices in the period between 2013 and 2017. In the NASDAQ index there 
is an increase in the number of IPO’s over the period, and in the year 2017 was where the 
highest number of IPO emissions was recorded. On the other hand, in the NYSE index 
no trend is observable. The years where most IPOs occurred were 2013, 2014 and 2015 
corresponding to 21.74%, 39.13% and 21.74% of the total IPO emissions, respectively. 
 
        Table 1 – Percentage of IPO’s by Index and Year for Sample 
 
 NASDAQ   NYSE 
YEAR # IPO's %   # IPO's % 
2013 2 9,52%   5 21,74% 
2014 3 14,29%   9 39,13% 
2015 4 19,05%   5 21,74% 
2016 5 23,81%   1 4,35% 
2017 7 33,33%   3 13,04% 





3.2.2. Sub-sample  
 
The sub-sample consists of 28 unicorns. The purpose of the construction of this sub-
sample is based on the comparative method to be applied. All unicorns in this sub-sample 
have market valuations prior to IPO. According to table 2, the number of IPOs is higher 
in the NYSE index compared to the NASDAQ. Regarding the NASDAQ index, a greater 
number of IPOs are observable in the year 2015, 2016 and 2017. For NYSE the year in 
which the greatest number of IPOs occurred was the year 2014 and 2015, with five issues 
each. 
 
Table 2 – Percentage of IPO’s by Index and Year for Sub-Sample 
 
 NASDAQ   NYSE 
YEAR # IPO's %   # IPO's % 
2013 1 8,33%   2 12,50% 
2014 2 16,67%   5 31,25% 
2015 3 25,00%   5 31,25% 
2016 3 25,00%   1 6,25% 
2017 3 25,00%   3 18,75% 
TOTAL 12 57,14%   16 76,19% 
 
 
As in the sample, a higher number of IPOs were observed in the NYSE index compared 
to the NASDAQ index. 
 
 
3.3. Variables  
 
For each of the variables of the study data were collected from three different 
moments. The applied methodology was based on the study of Aussenegg (1997). The 
defined moments corresponding to the first trading day, the 22nd day (1 month) trading 
and the 125th day (six months) trading.  
 
3.3.1. Dependent variable  
The dependent variable of this study is the market value of the unicorn (VMerci). In 
the calculation of this variable, the methodology applied by Bhagat and Rangan (2003) 
was replicated with some changes. Equation (1) shows how the dependent variable was 
calculated. The calculation used corresponds, 
𝑉𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑚 = 𝑃𝐹𝑖𝑚 × 𝑁𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑚 + 𝜀                  (1) 
 
Where, PFim is the closing price of the unicorn stock i at the moment m and NACim is the 






3.3.2. Explanatory variables  
 
In the definition of the explanatory variables we tried to choose those that best fit the 
characteristics of the companies under study. Table 3 summarizes the variables chosen 
by presenting the expected coefficient signal based on the literature. 
 
             Table 3 – Explanatory Variables 
 
Abbreviation Variable name Expected Signal 
RL Net Income + 
VEND Sales + 
I&D Research & Development + 
DEMP Firm Size + 
SUB Underestimation Initial + 
ALAF Financial Leverage - 
RMERC Return of the Market + 
RCAP Capital Rate Retained - 
 
 
As proxies for profitability, three variables were used. The variable RLit, the net income 
of each unicorn at different time points. The variable VENDit corresponds to the gross 
value of sales.  
RENTINICIALit corresponds to the initial return on each investor and is calculated as 




       (2) 
Where, PFit is the close prise of IPO of unicorn i in the first day of negotiation and POi é 
is the price of IPO of unicorn i.  
The proxies for growth expectations were R&Dit and DEMPit. R&D figures are the cost 
of research and development, while DEMPit is related to enterprise size, as measured by 
the total value of each unicorn's assets. For the characteristics of the company were used 
as proxy ALAVFit and RCAPit. The variable ALAVFit corresponds to financial leverage. 
It is calculated by the ratio of the assets to the debt of each unicorn. RCAPit is the capital 
retention rate after the IPO. RMERCit concerns the market profitability of each unicorn i 
at time t. In order to maintain the negative values of some of the variables, it was applied 
to all variables except the RCAP variable, the natural logarithm, using the methods of 
Hand (2000). The transformation applied to the variables was as follows, 
 
      Ln (Z) = Ln (Z + 1), if Z=0 
      Ln (Z) = - Ln (- Z + 1), if Z < 0  







3.4.1. Comparative Study 
 
Through the comparative study it was intended to observe the variation and the trend of 
the market value of unicorns. For this, the subsample was used and the study was made 
between five time points, moment before the IPO, moment of the IPO, at the end of the 
1st day, at the end of the 22nd day (1 month) and at the end of the 125th day (6 months). 
negotiation. The calculations used per period were as follows: 
∆% 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖 = [
𝑉𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖
𝑉𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑐𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝐼𝑃𝑂
− 1] ∗ 100   (3) 
Where i correspond to period at the time of the IPO, in the end of day 1, the end of day 
22 and the end of day 125. The market value corresponds to the average value of the 
subsample at each moment.  
 
3.4.2. Linear Regression 
 
The other aim of the study is to analyse which factors influence the market value of 














Where i correspond to each unicorn and t to each period at the time, in the end of day 1, 










4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 4 presents some variables that may characterize unicorns. Variables such as net 
income (RL), sales (VEND), research and development (R&D) costs, debt and assets are 
expressed in thousands of dollars. The underestimated initial variable (RENTINICIAL) 
is presented as a percentage, while the company age variable is expressed in years. 
 
 
             Table 4 – Statistics Descriptive 
    millions of USD 
Statistics 
 RL1 RL22 RL125 Trend 
Average -53,04 -113,37 8,65  
Median -24,26 -35,96 -28,15  
 VEND1 VEND22 VEND125  
Average 166,74 216,62 228,90  
Median 126,44 140,73 135,82  
 I&D1 I&D22 I&D125  
Average 38,81 71,79 75,27  
Median 23,25 28,21 33,20  
 Debt1 Debt22 Debt125  
Average 364,36 390,30 441,13  
Median 190,18 195,73 221,77  
 Asset1 Asset22 Asset125  
Average 560,30 799,92 957,94  
Median 326,85 394,66 506,56  
 RENTINICIAL CompanyAge   
Average 1,4575 9,5   
Median 1,3966 8,5     
 
 
At the end of the first day of trading, unicorns averaged a net profit of $ 53.040 million 
and a median of $ 24.260 million. On average, the net income of unicorns at the end of 
the 22nd trading day was $ 113.371 million and a median of $ 35.955 million. At the last 
moment of analysis, the average net income of unicorns stood at $ 8.650 million and the 
median at $ 28.150 million. Unicorn sales at the end of the first trading day averaged $ 
166.736 million. The median was $ 126.442 million. In the remaining two analysis 
moments, sales volume was $ 216,621 and $ 228,902 million at the end of the 22nd 
trading day and 125th trading day, respectively. The median in these two moments was $ 
140,731 and $ 135,818 million, respectively. There was a positive and growing trend, 
with sales volume increasing from the first period to the last period. Research and 
development costs, as well as sales volume, showed an increasing trend. Research and 
development costs averaged $ 38,814, $ 71,793 and $ 75.272 million at the three time 
points, respectively. The median was respectively $ 23,252, 28,214 and $ 33,204 million. 
This supports the idea of the importance of this heading for the development of unicorns. 




day, the 22nd trading day and the 125th trading day was $ 364.357, 390.299 and $ 441.131 
million, respectively. The asset value was $ 560.296 million on the first trading day, $ 
799.920 million after 22 trading days and $ 957.939 million after 125 trading days. 
Initial profitability measured by the understatement level is 145.75%. This means that 
investors who bought shares at the offer price yielded an average investment of 145.75%. 
The median initial profitability was 139.66%. Prior to the issuance of the IPO, unicorns 
remain private companies for an average of 9.5 years.  
 
 
4.2. Comparative Study 
 
Table 5 presents the market value of each unicorn at each of the five moments. For this 
study the subsample was used. 






















Atlassian Corporation Plc NASDAQ 3.300 4.400 5.797 5.190 5.120
Coupa Software Incorporated NASDAQ 1.000 1.700 1.601 1.220 1.220
Etsy NASDAQ 2.000 1.800 3.329 2.240 1.380
FireEye, Inc. NASDAQ 1.250 2.300 4.229 6.410 10.510
GoPro NASDAQ 2.300 3.000 3.859 5.820 7.810
Horton Works NASDAQ 1.100 659 1.098 1.220 1.130
MongoDB, Inc. NASDAQ 1.600 1.600 1.570 1.470 1.910
NantHealth, Inc. NASDAQ 2.000 1.700 2.244 1.560 1.570
Nutanix, Inc. NASDAQ 2.000 2.200 2.509 3.430 2.760
Okta, Inc. NASDAQ 1.200 1.500 2.134 2.170 2.580
Roku Inc NASDAQ 2.100 1.300 2.227 1.810 3.120
Sunrun NASDAQ 1.300 1.400 1.044 1.130 843
Blue Apron NYSE 2.000 1.895 1.896 448 787
Box, Inc. NYSE 2.400 1.700 2.705 2.280 2.010
Castlight Health, inc. NYSE 1.400 178 3.445 1.530 1.220
Cloudera, Inc. NYSE 4.100 1.900 2.318 2.750 2.170
Fitbit, Inc. NYSE 4.100 4.100 4.114 9.200 6.530
Intrexon NYSE 1.400 1.410 2.355 2.470 3.120
Lending Club NYSE 3.100 5.400 8.468 7.870 6.470
New Relic, Inc. NYSE 1.000 1.400 1.565 1.480 1.550
Pure Storage, Inc. NYSE 3.600 3.100 3.146 667 3.290
Quotiente Tecnology NYSE 1.000 1.200 2.180 1.690 1.240
Shopify Inc. NYSE 1.000 1.300 1.265 2.800 2.070
Snap Inc. NYSE 19.300 33.000 28.329 26.070 17.920
Square, Inc. NYSE 6.000 2.900 4.286 4.600 3.220
Twilio Inc. NYSE 1.100 2.000 2.367 3.450 2.540
Twitter, Inc. NYSE 8.000 24.600 24.906 32.180 20.930
Wayfair NYSE 1.900 2.400 3.122 2.100 2.630




The average unicorn market value was $ 2,948 million. At the time of IPO, the average 
market value that the unicorns presented was US $ 4.002 million, representing an increase 
of 35.73% over the unicorn market value. This evidence means that unicorns are 
undervalued compared to the time of IPO, presenting higher market values. The unicorns 
after the issuance of IPO, at the very end of the first trading day and at the end of the 22nd 
trading day, had, on average, market values of 4,575 and 4,831 million dollars, 
respectively. Given the unicorn market value, the values described above represent an 
increase of 55.19% and 63.85%, respectively. This means that the market value in unicorn 
and the market value at the time of IPO are undervalued in relation to the market. 
At the end of the 125th day the value of the unicorns was on average 4.202 billion dollars, 
which means an increase of 42.52% over the unicorn value. At this point, there was a 
correction made by the market, since the market value of the unicorns decreased 
compared to the market value at the end of the 22nd day. In terms of profitability, the 
investment in unicorns gave the investor an average yield of 49.32%. 
During the period considered, there was an increasing trend in market value, with the 
market starting to correct the value after 6 months (125th day). The unicorns are thus 
undervalued both in relation to the moment of IPO and the market, which translates into 




4.3. Linear Rgressions 
 
Using the least squares method, multiple linear regressions were used to explain what 
factors influence the market value of unicorns. Table 6 shows the results achieved by the 
linear regressions performed. The results were obtained through SPSS software. 
Table 6 –Results of Regression Model 
    Regression Model 
Market Value 1 22 125 
(Constant) Coefficient -27,756 -36,505 -27,757 
 Test t -5,598 -7,098 -8,443 
RL Coefficient -0,174 -0,386 0,143 
 Test t -0,770 -1,798*** 1,318 
VEND Coefficient 2,031 2,580 0,535 
 Test t 3,103* 4,451* 1,794*** 
I&D Coefficient 0,676 0,606 0,470 
 Test t -1,442 1,378  2,130**  
RCAP Coefficient 1,512 -0,840 -0,545 
 Test t 0,586 -0,339 -0,379 
DEMP Coefficient 2,545 3,004 3,576 
 Test t 3,358* 4,494* 8,217* 
ALAVF Coefficient -3,568 -5,421 -2,93 
 Test t -2,979* -5,146* -4,685* 
RENTINICIAL Coefficient 6,711 6,713 2,558 




RMERC Coefficient -114,919 21,491 11,777 
 Test t -1,408 1,206 2,391** 
     
 R Squared 0,609 0,700 0,790 
 Adjust R Squared  0,520 0,632 0,742 
 Durbin Watson 1,782 2,118 2,616 
 F Value 6,812* 10,231* 16,460* 




The three regression models present statistical significance, verified through the F 
statistic. With an adjusted square R of 52.00%, 63.20% and 74.20%, models 1, 22 and 
125, respectively, explain a large part of the variability of the market value of the unicorns 
The results presented by the three models show a positive and significant relationship (at 
the level of 1%) between the size of the company and the market value. These results 
suggest that firm size positively influences performance both at the time of IPO and after 
IPO, supporting the arguments presented by Hensler, Rutherford and Springer (1997), 
Gounopoulos, Nounis and Stylianides (2007) and Goergen, Khurshede and Mudambi 
(2007). This evidence also supports the arguments of Bhabra and Pettway (2003) who 
stated that the size of the company helps predict performance after IPO. In models 1 and 
22, sales are statistically significant (at the 1% level), showing a positive relation with the 
market value. In the regression model 125 sales continue to have a positive relationship 
with the market value of unicorns, but are only significant at the 10% level. This result 
supports the studies by Zarafat and Vejzagic (2014), suggesting that unicorn sales 
influence their market value significantly until the first month after IPO, losing some 
significance after six months.There is a negative and statistically significant relationship 
(at the level of 1%) between the level of financial leverage and the market value of 
unicorns, being transversal to all models. The findings are similar to those reported by 
Jing, Liao and Qian (2015) in their studies. A higher than-debt ratio, which translates into 
a high level of financial leverage, impairs the market value of unicorns, leading to poor 
performance after IPO. The relationship between the level of undervaluation and the 
market value is positive and significant at the time of IPO (model 1) and until one month 
after IPO (model 22). After six months, although the ratio remains positive, the level of 
understatement is significant only at the 10% level. This suggests that, in the short term, 
initial returns help predict market value, supporting the studies of Hensler, Rutherford 
and Springer (1997), contradicting the arguments put forward by Jing, Liao and Qian 
(2015) who stated that the returns performance after IPO, leading to lower market values. 
TheIn any of the three models, no evidence was found that capital retention helps to 
explain the market value of unicorns, contrary to what Hensler, Rutherford and Springer 




The results of model 125 suggest the existence of a positive and significant relationship 
(at a 10% level) of research and development costs and market profitability with the 
market value of unicorns. After six months’ research and development costs are important 
to explain the market value of unicorns, in line with the one suggested by Myers (1977). 
We also verified the assumptions related to normality, autocorrelation and 
multicollinearity. 
In this study the Durbin Watson test was used to detect the presence of autocorrelation. 
With values of 1,782, 2,118 and 2,616 for models 1, 22 and 125, respectively, the results 
suggest that there is no correlation between the residues. 
To validate the multicollinearity assumption, the FIV (Variance Inflation Factor) was 







The evaluation of the unicorns produces great discussion and scepticism in the financial 
markets. Some say that the level of evaluation is related to the number of rounds of 
funding for unicorns, others say that their assessment is linked to the technological 
potential they present and their potential for growth. In this study, we tried to understand 
if the unicorns were or not overvalued. A comparative study was made that analysed the 
market value of unicorns at various points in time. A regressive analysis was also carried 
out in order to understand what kind of factors could influence the market value of 
unicorns. The study provides evidence that unicorns have lower market values prior to 
IPO compared to market values presented at the time of IPO and are therefore 
undervalued. Compared with the time after IPO, the market values when unicorns are also 
undervalued. After six months the market value of the unicorns begins to adjust, so 
possibly with a longer time horizon the adjustment would be greater. 
The investigations developed through linear regressions show that the level of 
undervaluation and the value of sales present positive and significant relationships with 
the market value of the unicorns. On the other hand, the level of financial leverage is 
negatively and significantly related to the market value of unicorns. After six months, 
research and development costs as well as market profitability have a slight significance 
in explaining the market value of unicorns. The retention of capital has no relation or 
significance to the market value of unicorns. The results obtained were the converse to 
what was previously idealized. The unicorns were presumed to be overvalued, which did 
not happen. The development of this study demystifies the idea presented above, also 
collaborating in the discovery of significant factors for the market value of unicorns.  
The central question of this study was to see if the unicorns were overvalued, so, through 
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